

UL 4600

Technical Overview

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Webinar Goals



UL 4600: Standard for Safety for the Evaluation of Autonomous Products

■ Overview for technical stakeholders

- Comments due Friday November 1

■ Goals for this Webinar

- Orientation to standard for technical audience
- Key principles to keep in mind when commenting
- How to get a copy and submit comments
- Q&A



Why UL?



■ Underwriters Laboratories:

working for a Safer World for 125 years

- Published first safety standard in 1903
- Focus on research, education, and more than 1,700 standards

■ UL's Standards Development process

- Consensus process
- Open, transparent, and timely
- Continuous standards maintenance



UL 4600 Standards Technical Panel (STP)

■ STP is the voting consensus body

ANSYS	Bejing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry	Intel Corp	Nanyang Technological University	Robert Bosch LLC
Argo AI	Center for Auto Safety	Intertek	NIO	UBER ATG
Aurora Innovations	Consumer Product Safety Commission	Liberty Mutual Insurance Company	Nissan North America Inc	UL LLC
AXA XL	Daimler Trucks North America	Locomation	Oak Ridge National Laboratory	University of York
Azevtec Inc	Edge Case Research	The MITRE Corp	Penn DoT	University of Waterloo
Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir	Infineon Technologies AG	Munich Re America	Renesas Electronics Europe GBMH	US DoT



Timeline

■ Initial drafting

- July 2018: Announced intent to develop UL 4600

■ STP revisions

- June 2019: STP meeting to discuss first full draft
- Three rounds of STP comment & draft revisions completed

■ Stakeholder comments

- Oct 2019: Stakeholder preliminary draft available
- Stakeholder comments due Nov 1, 2019

■ Target final version release Q1 2020



■ Orientation to current preview draft version

- Contents and organization subject to change!

■ UL 4600 Scope

- Fully Autonomous Vehicle (AV) operation
- No human driver/supervisor

■ Main principles

- Safety case is front and center

■ Guide to review & comments



**Carnegie
Mellon
University**

- **Goal: structured way to argue that AV sufficiently safe**
 - Non-prescriptive, safety case approach
 - Trace all safety goals (claims) to evidence
 - Checks and balances (self-audit and independent)
- **Monitoring and feedback**
 - Detect invalid assumptions & gaps in coverage
- **System Level + Life Cycle approach**
 - Includes fault recovery, supply chain issues, expected misuse
- **Reference lists to improve completeness**
 - Prompts & epistemic defeaters for coverage (#DidYouThinkofThat?)
 - Ability to argue that some prompts aren't applicable



Why UL 4600?



- **Autonomous systems have unique needs**
 - No human supervision, non-determinism, ...
 - This version: highly automated vehicles
- **System level approach needed**
 - Functional safety, SOTIF, road tests, simulation all play a role
 - But need a framework to put the pieces together
 - Adapt as technology evolves
- **Cooperate rather than compete**
 - Can accept work products from ISO 26262, ISO/PAS 21448, etc.
- **Goal: guidance on “Is system engineering rigor sufficient?”**

■ Traditional safety standards are prescriptive

- “Here is how to do safety” (process, work products)
 - ISO 26262, ISO/PAS 21448, IEC 61508, MIL-STD 882, etc.
- But, we’re still figuring out some aspects of AV safety



■ UL 4600 is goal based: “be acceptably safe”

- Use a Safety Case to argue system is acceptably safe
 - Define what safe means; argue that AV meets that definition
 - Do **NOT** prescribe any particular engineering approach
 - **DO** require a set of minimum acceptable topics for safety case
- Require use of any good system engineering process (not just V)

What's A Safety Case?



- **A structured argument backed by evidence**

- Notation agnostic / use any reasonable notation

- **SubGoal/Claim: “AV will not hit pedestrians”**


- **Hypothetical Arguments**

- “AV will detect pedestrians of all types”
- “AV will stop or avoid collision detected pedestrians”
- “We have identified & mitigated risks caused by difficult to detect pedestrians”

- **Hypothetical Evidence**

- “Here are results of detect & avoid tests”
- “Here is analysis of coverage of different types of pedestrians”
- “Reliability growth data shows high pedestrian coverage”

■ System level safety for autonomous operation & lifecycle



■ Related topics

- ADAS features
- AV testing safety (but, see BSI/PAS 1881)
- Ethical guidelines (but, see IEEE P7009)

■ Human factors

- Human attention (as driver; as safety supervisor)
- How to argue humans will behave as required
- How to argue human safety supervisor will react correctly

■ Details of security

- Requires security plan; maps security plan to safety
- Does not attempt to define what is in security plan



- **Extensive lists of safety case topics, hazards, etc.**
 - Good practices & Pitfalls (lessons learned & bad practices to avoid)
- **Prompts must be considered, not necessarily adopted**
 - **Mandatory:** you have to do this
 - **Required:** can deviate ONLY if inherently inapplicable
 - E.g., if no machine learning, then can deviate from ML requirements
 - **Highly Recommended:** can deviate with non-trivial rationale
 - **Recommended:** entirely optional
 - **Examples:** illustrative reminders; do not have to address each one
- **Many processes and technique areas are lightly constrained**
 - E.g., Identify hazards, but use any reasonable technique

■ Define relevant ODD considering:

- Infrastructure
- Weather & road conditions
- Object & event ontology
- Own and other vehicle conditions
- ... many other things




■ Exiting ODD must be safe

- Due to environment change (unexpected snow)
- Due to ODD ontology gap (“what the heck is that???”)
- Due to equipment failure (potentially using degraded modes)

- **Travel infrastructure**
EXAMPLES: types of road surfaces, road geometries, bridge restrictions
- **Object coverage** (i.e., objects within ODD)
- **Event coverage**
EXAMPLES: interactions with infrastructure
- **Behavioral rules**
EXAMPLES: traffic laws, system path conflict resolution priority, local customs, justifiable rule breaking for safety
- **Environmental effects**
EXAMPLES: weather, illumination
- **Vulnerable populations**
EXAMPLES: pedestrians, motorcycles, bikes, scooters, other at-risk road users, other road users
- **Seasonal effects**
EXAMPLES: foliage changes, sun angle changes, seasonally-linked events (e.g., Oktoberfest)
- **Support infrastructure, if any is relied upon**
EXAMPLES: types of traffic signs, travel path geometry restrictions, other markings
- **Localization support, if relied upon**
EXAMPLES: GNSS availability, types of navigation markers, DSRC, other nav aids
- **Compliance strategy for traffic rules**
EXAMPLE: enumeration of applicable traffic regulations and ego vehicle behavioral constraints
- **Special road user rules**
EXAMPLES: bicycles, motorcycles/lane splitting, construction systems, oversize systems, snowplows, sand/salt trucks, emergency response systems, street sweepers, horse-drawn systems
- **Road obstructions**
EXAMPLES: pedestrian zone barriers, crowd control barriers, police vehicles intentionally blocking traffic, post-collision vehicles and associate debris, other road debris, other artificial obstructions

■ Autonomy Pipeline candidate best practices & pitfalls

- Sensing (e.g., correlated sensor faults)
- Perception (e.g., brittle perception, ontology gaps)
- Machine learning (e.g., overfitting)
- Planning (e.g., plan exceeds vehicle capability)
- Prediction (e.g., mis-predictions, sudden changes)
- Trajectory & control (e.g., degraded vehicle capabilities)
- Timing (e.g., loss of control loop stability)



■ “Item” covered by safety case includes safety related:

- Autonomy (sensors, algorithms, actuators)
- Vehicle (safety related within autonomy purview)
- Maintenance and inspection procedures
- Lifecycle issues and supply chain
- Data sources and feeds, including maps, ML training



■ Assumptions & supporting requirements

- ODD characterization
- Road infrastructure support
- Procedural support (e.g., safety related inspections)

■ Safety related maintenance

- What maintenance is required for safety?
- Are procedures documented?
- How do you know it is done effectively?



■ Safety related inspections

- What/when are inspections required?
- Detection of vehicle & infrastructure problems (e.g., loose wheel)
- Are you trusting casual passengers with life critical inspections?
 - (Really? Is that a good idea?)

- **Item has valid safety case at all times once deployed**

- **Safety related aspects of lifecycle**

- Requirements/design/ML training
- Handoff to manufacturing
- Manufacturing & deployment
- Supply chain
- Field modifications & updates
- Operation
- Retirement & disposal

- **Update distribution & integrity**

- Version control & configuration management



Is sensor cleaning fluid life critical?

- **There is no “captain of the ship”**
 - Autonomy must assume responsibility
- **Interacting with people**
 - Occupants, cargo loading
 - Pedestrians & mobility device users
 - Other drivers
 - Special populations
 - Misuse, pranks, malfeasance
- **Safety related lifecycle participants**
 - Inspection & maintenance accuracy
- **Safety culture for all stakeholders**




Is it safe to drive now?

■ Inductive proofs are never complete

- The black swan problem –
you don't know what you don't know

■ Addressed via:

- Extensive use of prompts for better coverage
- Epistemic defeaters (e.g., pitfalls)
- Monitoring required for assumptions and unknowns



Every observed swan is white.
Therefore all swans are white.

■ Deploying with uncertainty

- You will deploy believing you are acceptably safe
- Use monitoring to reduce margin of belief uncertainty

■ Self-audit

- Audit safety case for completeness
- Check technical aspects for reasonableness
- In close collaboration with the development team



■ Independent assessor


- Independence from developer & competence must be documented
- Check and balance on self-audit
- NOT expected to find technical defects

■ Developers must “own” safety


- Audits & assessments serve as a check and balance

■ Feedback used to mitigate risk of unknowns

- **Within product:** incidents trigger safety case update
- **At Assessment:** updates trigger assessments
- **Standards Process:** emergent issues trigger ~yearly standard update



- **Generalized idea of System Element out of Context (SEooC)**
 - Hardware and/or software
- **Idea: design-by-contract component interface**
 - Assured properties (services; functions)
 - Assumptions made by component
 - Must match promises made by system
 - Component assurance context
 - Fault model
 - Subset of UL 4600 clauses assessed
 - Can assess SEooC conformance independent of system





■ Continual changes

- System functionality update
- Different ODD (changing ODD scope; surprises)

■ Assessment in response to changes:

- Impact analysis
- If required: Update safety case
- If safety case updated: Update self-audit
- If “big” safety case change: Independent Assessment update

■ “Size” of change relates to safety case, not lines of code

- Impact analysis informs scope of self-audit/assessments

■ Prompt element deviation categories:

- **Mandatory / Required / Highly Recommended / Recommended**
 - E.g.: “REQUIRED” can only deviate if intrinsically inapplicable

■ Integrity levels

- Define at least two integrity levels: **life critical** & **injury**
 - OK to adopt more and/or existing levels (e.g., ASIL, SIL, DAL)
- Define level of rigor/technique use based on integrity level

■ Example: Static analysis

- **Required** that static analysis is used to some degree
- Coverage, tools, tool settings **based on Integrity level**

■ ISO 26262 – starting point

- Still relevant to the extent it can be applied
- Assumes traceability of tests to design with “V”

■ ISO/PAS 21448 & SaFAD – more guidance

- Design and validation process framework

■ UL 4600 – #DidYouThinkofThat?

- Provides a template for technical safety report
- Minimum criteria for complete coverage + feedback requirement
- Lists of positive and negative lessons learned
- Objective assessment criteria for safety case



■ Organized by practitioner skill set

1. Preface
2. Scope
3. References
4. Terms
5. Safety case & arguments
6. Risk assessment
7. Humans & road users
8. Autonomy
9. Software & system engineering
10. Dependability
11. Data & networking
12. Verification & validation
13. Tool qualification
14. Lifecycle concerns
15. Maintenance
16. Metrics
17. Assessment

■ Catalog of best practices: #DidYouThinkofThat?

- Avoid missed hazards
- Avoid pitfalls
- Mechanism for industry to share without sharing detailed data

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■ Objective, repeatable independent assessment

- Self-audit is first level of checks and balances
 - Feedback identifies surprises/gaps
- Independent assessment is about well-formed safety case
 - **Not** subjective opinion about whether developer tried hard enough
 - Prompt elements provide a safety case coverage floor
 - But, developer assumes burden for safety

Get Involved: Submit Comments



- **Commenting requires registering as stakeholder**
 - E-mail to: <Deborah.Prince@ul.com>
- **Use supplied spreadsheet for consideration**
 - Please make as concrete & actionable as possible

Reviewing Organization:		PUT YOUR ORGANIZATION HERE			
Point of Contact:		PUT YOUR NAME and e-mail address HERE; please combine comments			
#	Page	Clause	Old text	New text	Discussion
1	54	5.2.3.3.c.1	Quote the old text before change	Your proposed new text with change	Explain (could be just "typo" or "format" if that is the issue).
2					
3					



Comments & Timeline

■ Official version & comment spreadsheet via UL CSDS

- Other public materials and draft at: UL4600.com

■ Timeline:

- Comments due Friday Nov 1st via CSDS upload
- Potentially voting draft in December
- Target for approved standard: Q1 2020.

■ Will Stakeholder names be public?

- Stakeholder list itself is private
- However, all preliminary review comments are public & attributed to commenter

